clauses after 800 contests, a great many for so simple a game. To make its memory tractable, Morph limits the number of concepts retained at any moment to 5000. Phoenix made better moves with MACH, but used the pattern-based elements in the evaluation function only at the root and not at subsequent nodes because it was so time-consuming to search and evaluate the pattern-based terms.
In the work described here, learned pattern knowledge is used to construct higher-order, spatially-based reasoning agents. Programs that learn concepts from game-playing experience have in the past been hampered by a predicate calculus representation that lacks incisiveness, and by exhaustive explanation of inconsistencies for positions that may have no consequence in the strategic play of the game (Fawcett and Utgoff, 1991; Yee, et al., 1990) . The process we describe, in contrast, is able to deal with inconsistencies robustly while it focuses attention on those situations containing important visual patterns. Pell deduces higher-order reasoning agents from the rules of a game, agents which may or may not be pattern-based (Pell, 1993) . In contrast, our work induces them from playing experience .
The major contribution of this work is a system that limits the cost of creating strategically meaningful higher order concepts by remembering a limited group of patterns associated with wins, losses and draws as a basis for new spatial concepts. We used thresholding, aging and consistency mechanisms to filter the cache formation process. The process of creating a restricted set of patterns might leave some information out of the learning process. We found, however, that the concepts formed were those that are deemed important in published analyses of those games that we tested.
The long-range objective of this work is to create a heuristically-based decision maker that learns rapidly enough to participate in intelligent behavior while it is still acquiring knowledge.
Within a hierarchical multi-agent system the presence of other, more general problem solving agents prevents incorrect actions, especially during early experience while learning. In this paper we show that the system functioned within this environment. We found that the validation process for newly-created agents performed properly, and that the system worked smoothly as knowledge was being refined during the learning process. We believe that this process of creating new agents and testing their correctness in a multiple-agent program is unique.
The multi-agent game playing program is detailed in Section 2, the pattern-based learning system in Section 3, and the results of our experiments in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and related work is presented in Section 6. For this initial test of the approach we used simple games and made some simplifications in the individual component parts of the program and their operation. We discuss these and methods for scaling the approach to more complex games in Section 7.
A game-learning program
There is evidence that humans integrate a variety of strategies to accomplish problem solving (Biswas, et al., 1995; Crowley and Siegler, 1993; Ratterman and Epstein, 1995) . For example, the primate visual system has pathways for form, place, motion, and color (DeYoe and Van Essen, 1988; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982) . Information from these streams is combined to form a perception of the visible world (Kandel, 1991) . In addition, it has been found that different parts of the brain are activated when decisions are being made about different strategic aspects of chess (Nichelli, et al., 1994) .
The mechanisms we describe below simulate these features. Hoyle is a program that learns to play two-person, perfect information, finite-board games. It is based on a learning and problemsolving architecture for skills called FORR, which employs multiple concurrent decision-making agents (Epstein, 1994a) . Hoyle, as modified here, includes a separate stream for pattern learning. Hoyle learns to play in competition against a hand-crafted, external expert program for each specific new game. As shown in the schematic of Figure 2 , whenever it is Hoyle's turn to move, a hierarchy of resource-limited procedures called Advisors is provided with the current game state, the legal moves, and any useful knowledge (described below) already acquired about the game. Hoyle learns from its experience to make better decisions based on acquired useful knowledge.
Useful knowledge is expected to be relevant to future play and is probably correct in the full context of the game tree. Examples of useful knowledge include recommended openings and states from which a win is always achievable with perfect play on both sides. Each item of useful knowledge is associated with at least one learning algorithm. The learning methods for useful knowledge vary. (Epstein, 1992) .
Learning to use and apply patterns
The crux of this paper is the addition to Hoyle of pattern learning and its application in new, game-dependent third-tier Advisors. With only 22 Advisors, the program had already learned to play 18 different games extremely well. The implementation of pattern learning and its application were inspired by repeated laboratory experiences with people, in the context of many different games. College students spoke about, reacted to, and relied upon familiar, sometimes symmetrically transposed, patterns while learning (Ratterman and Epstein, 1995) . Later, they relied heavily upon these patterns as a kind of compiled expertise.
In this work, visually-perceived regularities are represented as patterns, small geometric arrangements of marker types (e.g., black, X) and unoccupied positions (blanks) in a particular geographical location. A new useful knowledge object, the associative pattern store, provides a heuristically-organized database that links patterns with contest outcome (win, loss, or draw).
The associative pattern store includes a set of templates, a waiting list, a pattern cache, generated concepts, and uninformative patterns. Morris games offer substantial challenges: five men's morris has about nine million states in its search space, nine men's about 7.7 billion (Gasser, In press ). 
Constructing a Pattern Based Language
For purposes of this investigation of simple games, we begin with a set of prespecified, gameindependent, perceptually-biased templates. For larger, more complex games we would expect to use a more a sophisticated pattern classifier. One must choose between a complete language capable of expressing any pattern along with induction rules that generate many, overly complex instances, and an explicitly-biased language that filters potential concepts at the risk of not expressing everything. We have chosen the latter for two reasons: because people are known to have visual perceptual biases for small geometric groupings (Hendee, 1993; McBurney and Collings, 1977) and the implementation of pattern learning and its application were inspired by repeated laboratory experiences with people, in the context of many different games (Ratterman and Epstein, 1995) . While T2's bias emphasizes moves later in a contest, and Morph's bias emphasizes threat and defense, our bias is toward visual patterns. We do not claim that our bias is better, but we present evidence here that with it we can learn certain kinds of concepts inexpressible, or unlikely to be learned, with the other biases.
BPL (Bounded Pattern Language) is a set of expressions, each of which describes a shape delineated by some number of required points. There are five valid expressions in BPL: straight lines, squares, diagonals, L's, and triangles without right angles. Definitions of these expressions appear in Table 2 . A BPL expression has ?'s in its required positions and #'s in its irrelevant ("don't care") ones. Each of them, except for diagonals, is constructed only from predrawn straight line segments on the game board. For example, a BPL square has ?'s in each of its four required corners, and has sides that are already drawn as lines on the game board. The size and location of the square are deliberately unspecified. To scale such shapes to a game board, a metric is necessary. Let the version of the game board drawn for output, as in Figure 4 , be called the picture. The metric unit for the game board is the smallest Euclidean distance in the picture between any two positions where markers can be
placed. An example of the board-specific metric unit is darkened for each game board in Figure   4 . A pattern specifies a mover and instantiates the ?'s in a board-specific template with blanks and the markers of one or both contestants. For example, Figure 5 (c) is an example of a pattern formed from the nine men's morris square template in Figure 5 (a). It specifies that black is the mover and already occupies all the corners of the size-4 square. Each template is matched to a game board using any of the eight symmetries of the two-dimensional plane (the identity mapping, three rotations, and four reflections).
Associate: learn responses for patterns
The first of the four processes in Figure 3 is the association of responses with the identified patterns. The pattern classifier is an algorithm that processes the patterns identified by the boardspecific templates of the preceding section. It associates each pattern with a response, defined as a sequence of three integers that count number of contests won by the first contestant, number won by the second contestant, and number drawn in which this pattern appeared.
Most states match one or more templates and therefore make multiple contributions to the associative pattern store. For the purposes of this study, we limited pattern learning to at most four distinct, crucial states, the two from each stage resulting from each contestant's last nonforced move. (Such a state offers the mover more than one legal move and has no immediate block to a win the other contestant would have if it were her turn instead.) Our premise is that a state that achieves a goal or subgoal for either player is one that contains key patterns. Such states result from significant attention, and, to the extent that the opponent is an expert whose move may have been pattern-based, they can offer a particular benefit. Of course, the non-forced move states, while not necessarily endgame states, are closely related to them. One could extend our procedures to subgoals to provide patterns less oriented to states at the end of each stage. The algorithm matches the selected states against the board-specific templates, adjusting for all 8 symmetries. The patterns detected at the end of each contest are processed one at a time by the patternlearning algorithm sketched in Table 3 . When it is first identified, a pattern not among the uninformative pattern section of the store (see Section 3.3) is relegated to the waiting list, labeled with its mover, its contest outcome, and the number of the contest in which it has appeared. For example, the first time that the pattern shown in Figure 5 (c) is encountered in the placing stage of nine men's morris and associated with a win, the pattern would enter the placing stage waiting list for that game with response 1-0-0 (number of times the first contestant has won, lost, and drawn with this pattern, respectively), and the contest number in which it appeared. When a pattern already on the waiting list is re-encountered, its response values are updated and the new contest number is recorded. Thus if the same pattern is encountered again in the placing stage and as a win, the pattern's response is updated to 2-0-0 with that contest number.
We also age response values by multiplying them by an aging parameter at the end of every contest but before any new patterns are processed. A pattern association which does not reappear will eventually be forgotten as its response value eventually reaches effective zero. Thus, onetime experiences are not retained. There are, of course, one-time experiences worthy of retention.
These, we argue, are cases, not patterns, and are more appropriately learned by other components of the system.
Managing inconsistency
Because a novice cannot always capitalize appropriately on its own good patterns or exploit the opposition's poor ones, the learner may initially make incorrect associations, only to find them contradicted later when it plays better (Epstein, 1994c 
Managing consistency
When a pattern has consistently appeared with the same association, it shifts from the waiting list to the pattern cache. There are two criteria for this shift: the pattern must have appeared a certain number of times (the threshold parameter) and exactly two of the pattern's response values must effectively be zero. Admittedly, if two patterns appear the same number of times with the same associations, the one detected earlier will age its inconsistencies sooner and could thereby migrate to the cache sooner. Because pattern learning is presumed to be an ongoing process, we do not consider this unreasonable.
Response values can eventually reach effective zero because they too are multiplied by an aging parameter in the same way as the waiting list. Aging for the cache is slower than for the waiting list because it is important to retain salient patterns that are only seen occasionally. If a pattern has not occurred for a long time, however, its value diminishes; this is why consistentlyassociated patterns must be promoted from the cache to the status of concept. Concepts are not aged; corrections to their relevance are based only on new evidence as described in Section 3.5.
We note that there is refinement of the contents of both the waiting list and pattern cache in terms of a threshold to get into the waiting list, aging in both the waiting list and pattern cache, and the management of both consistent and inconsistent entries. Although we did not perform a quantitative study of this cache refinement process, we did find that without it performance degraded. These processes are ongoing and constantly refine the storage of important patterns with experience.
Generalize: formulate concepts from the associative pattern store
Cached patterns are a rich source of information about the marker clusters to be seen during a particular game. Some of them ought to be forgotten; others are worthy of elevation to concepts that drive game-dependent Advisors. The identification of both kinds of patterns is done during a periodic sweep of the cache. Currently, the first sweep of the pattern cache to form concepts is after 15 contests, and then the frequency is recomputed as a function of the confidence parameter after each sweep.
Some small patterns are identified in every, or almost every, contest of a particular game, regardless of its outcome. For example, the pattern consisting of an X at either end of the top lose tic-tac-toe row and a blank in the center often occurs when it is O's turn to move. Almost every lose tic-tac-toe contest produces this "X-blank-X in the top row, O to move" pattern, regardless of the contest's outcome. We found such patterns offered no meaningful associations yet were costly to process, and have therefore developed a method that learns to avoid their repeated consideration. A pattern that appears in almost every contest of a particular game, regardless of its outcome, is learned as uninformative. When a pattern is first extracted with a template, it is checked against the uninformative patterns first, to see if it warrants further processing.
Furthermore, if every possible instantiation of a template becomes an uninformative pattern, then the template itself is discarded, so that no future pattern observation uses it.
Generalization summarizes a set of detailed experiences into a more useful and efficient representation. Hoyle has two generalization rules to form concepts. Patterns in a cache are said to agree when they originate from the same template and pertain to the same stage.
• Given distinct agreeing patterns P1, P2, and P3 with q ?'s that have the same mover and single, non-zero response, and are identical, except that in the ith position P1 has a black, P2 a white, and P3 a nil value, construct a new pattern P on the q-1 ?'s other than the ith. An example appears in Figure 6 (a).
• Given distinct agreeing patterns P1 and P2 such that interchanging the contestants' markers and changing the mover in P1 results in P2 with the opposite single non-zero response, construct a new pattern P with variable place holders α for black and β for white. An example appears in Figure 6 (b). Figure 6 : Two generalization rules that are applied to patterns to formulate concepts.
Proceduralize: convert knowledge into advice
Proceduralization is the transformation of expert knowledge into expert behavior. This is a nontrivial task in AI (Mostow, 1983) . When there is much data or it conflicts in its potential application, as with pattern knowledge, interesting challenges arise. Each segment of the associative pattern store therefore relates differently to decision making. Patterns on the waiting list have no impact on decision making at all. Patterns in the cache serve as input to the associative pattern classifier, Patsy. Pattern-based concepts become game-specific Advisors.
Patsy, the game-independent, pattern-based Advisor
The new, game-independent, second-tier Advisor Patsy ranks legal next moves based on the way the states they engender match patterns in the cache. new patterns associated with a win or a draw, while it discourages moves that lead to states introducing patterns associated with a loss. As the strength of the associations changes with time and experience, Patsy adapts its advice appropriately.
A set of game-dependent, pattern-based Advisors
Like most game-playing programs, Hoyle gets into difficulty in the middlegame. It learns openings by copying them from its opponents. It learns endgame play by selective retrograde analysis, reasoning backward from some of the states experienced during play and storing the correct moves along with the significant states (Epstein, 1992) . Frequently, however, the middlegame gets murky. There may be several dozen legal moves, among which the second-tier
Advisors see as many as a third as viable alternatives. A traditional game-playing program faces a similar situation when it has searched interesting lines to some depth and its evaluation function detects no strong preference. A new, pattern-based third tier of game-dependent
Advisors is designed to resolve middlegame dilemmas.
Each concept is proceduralized as a new, third-tier, game-specific Advisor. If the perfectlycorrect, game-independent first-tier Advisors can select a move with their game-specific useful knowledge, they do so and the second tier is never consulted. If the heuristic but generally correct, game-independent second-tier Advisors can agree upon a move with their game-specific useful knowledge, they do so. Otherwise the moves judged equally good by the second tier are forwarded to the newly-created third tier of game-dependent, pattern-based Advisors. For concept C in game G the new G C -Advisor comments only in game G. The G C -Advisor advocates any move to a state where a new instance of C is introduced, and opposes any move to a state where an instance of C is eliminated, in a comment whose strength is a function of C. In the formulation of its comment, G C does not consider the presence or absence of any other pattern concepts.
Validate: confirm the accuracy of new Advisors
As new, pattern-based Advisors are introduced and Hoyle's skill develops further, some of them may prove irrelevant, self-contradictory, or untrustworthy, despite prior empirical evidence of their validity. Credit/blame assignment in a domain such as this is extremely difficult. At the end of a contest, it is difficult, even for human experts, to pinpoint the move that won or lost. The significant decision may have been early in play, or may have been a set of moves rather than an individual one. Rather than credit or blame a particular move, we have chosen to credit or blame the Advisors that support expert-like behavior.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical game state in which Hoyle has only second-tier comments (Advisor-1, move-1, strength-1) and (Advisor-2, move-2, strength-2). Until now, if strength-1 and strength-2 were equal, the vote would be a tie, and one of the moves would have been chosen at random. If Advisor-2 were more trustworthy in this particular game, however, its comment should have more influence. This approach holds the rationale behind actions accountable, rather than the actions themselves. Irrelevant and self-contradictory Advisors in a particular game should have weight 0, and more trustworthy Advisors should have higher weights than less trustworthy ones. Empirical experience with Hoyle indicates that these weights are problem-class specific, i.e., a new item of useful knowledge to be learned. With an external model of expertise as its performance criterion, we use a perceptron-like model called AWL to learn problem-class-specific weights for the decision-making procedure (Epstein, 1994b) . Rather than tally each comment of the same strength as equivalent, AWL learns game-dependent, stage-dependent weights for all second-tier and third-tier Advisors, so that, for example, two comments with the same strength would not necessarily be treated equally. Advisors at the end of each contest (whether or not the third tier would actually have voted during play), and uses those weights to make decisions throughout the subsequent contest. The weights are a modification of Littlestone's perceptron-like algorithm (Littlestone, 1988) .
Updating during play would slow Hoyle down considerably; we massively update the weights at the end of each contest instead.
Results
In all of the experiments described here, Hoyle alternately moved first in one contest and second in the next. Such a trial continued until Hoyle was said to have learned to play a game because it could draw n consecutive contests in this environment. Once it met this behavioral standard, learning was turned off and the program was tested against a variety of challengers that simulated perfect, expert (10% random move selection, 90% perfect), novice (70% random move selection, 30% perfect), and random contestants. The threshold parameter, effective zero, the aging parameter for the waiting list, and the aging parameter for the cache, all described in Section 3, were 5, .01, .9, and .999 respectively. Without contradiction or further reinforcement, a single outcome will remain on a waiting list that way for 459 contests, and in the cache for 4603 contests. All trials included the AWL algorithm of the preceding section (Epstein, 1994b) .
Data for each game is averaged across 10 trials, and examples of consistently learned, patternbased concepts for the three games appear in Figures 7, 8 , and 9.
We have used pattern-based learning with Hoyle in tic-tac-toe, lose tic-tac-toe (played exactly like tic-tac-toe except that the first contestant to achieve three of the same playing piece along a row, column, or diagonal loses ), and five men's morris. Since Hoyle had already learned to play all the games studied here expertly after relatively few contests, these experiments were intended to demonstrate that game-dependent visual patterns exist and persist, despite the nondeterminism of the learning experience. We found that the potential computational overhead for concept formation is avoided because very few of the possible patterns ever appear on the waiting list or in the cache. In tic-tac-toe, despite the potentially large number of patterns, after learning there were 58 patterns in the waiting list, 22.2 patterns in the cache, 4.2 uninformative patterns, and 6.4 concepts, all for draws. In lose tic-tac-toe, with the same potential number of patterns, after learning there were 58.8 patterns in the waiting list, 57.2 patterns in the cache, 1.4
uninformative patterns, and 19 concepts, some for draws and others for losses.
Hoyle also learned the same pattern-based concepts on every run of a fixed game. This is particularly significant because the program is non-deterministic, i.e., its playing experience on every run is different. For example, all but the last concept in Figure 7 were learned and preserved on all tic-tac-toe runs; the last was learned four times. There are, as one would expect, slightly varying numeric responses from one run to the next. In lose tic-tac-toe the top four concepts were learned on every run and always appear with the highest weights in the third tier.
In addition, the Advisor Patsy was highly weighted by the AWL validation algorithm, indicating that game-specific pattern-based reasoning performed more like the external expert opponent that most of the other game-independent heuristics in the second tier. After learning tic-tac-toe, Patsy's average rank by weight among the Advisors in the second tier was 3 out of 17; after learning lose tic-tac-toe Patsy's average rank was 6.5 out of 17. AWL assesses Patsy to be a valuable Advisor. The growth in the weight of Patsy and in the weights of the pattern-based
Advisors simulates the transition from high-level reasoning to skill learning.
With sufficient experience, Hoyle learns concepts based upon the patterns in the cache, concepts found to be correct by our own analysis or from previously published analyses of those games. The concept in Figure 7a , for example, describes control of the center. Although it appears to be a simple pattern, it is actually a generalization over a set of persistent patterns. The concepts in Figure 7e and 7f advocate blocking an incipient win in the center of a row or on one end. Figure 7 : Some learned concepts for tic-tac-toe. α and β denote either X or O (or black or white) consistently; NIL denotes an empty position. Note that the mover for a concept is in the current state, but the pattern is matched for in a subsequent state.
The AWL algorithm functioned properly and was able to unlearn irrelevant or incorrect pattern-based concepts. These were created during the period when Hoyle was learning incorrect New heuristics are learned which were previously obscured by the manner in which the rules were accessed. The program experiences the rules of a game only as a set of "black boxes" that return the current state, the legal moves from it, and whether or not a state results in a win, a loss, or a draw. Consider, for example, what we term here confinement, the concept of restricting a five men's morris marker to a corner so that it can no longer slide. (Recall that a morris contestant unable to slide loses.) Confinement, the rightmost concept in Figure 9 , is learned by Hoyle on every run. The concept of a mill (three markers of the same color on immediately adjacent positions on a line) was also previously outside the program's knowledge. (Hoyle only knows that certain moves permit it to capture, but not why.) Now on every run of five men's morris, Hoyle learns the first two concepts in Figure 9 as a pair of Advisors that subgoal on mills.
Correct reflection concept
Found to be incorrect Found to be irrelevant Figure 8 : Some learned concepts for lose tic-tac-toe. α and β denote either X or O (or black or white) consistently; NIL denotes an empty position. Note that the mover for a concept is in the current state, but the pattern is matched for in a subsequent state.
Hoyle learned tic-tac-toe with a behavioral standard of 10 against an external, expert, gamespecific program that played perfectly. It learned lose tic-tac-toe and five men's morris, however, with a behavioral standard of 20 and lesson and practice training (Epstein, 1994c) . In this environment (unnecessary for the easier of game tic-tac-toe), the program cycles between lessons (a set of two contests against the expert) and practice (a set of seven contests against itself).
Without lesson and practice training, Hoyle had learned the correct patterns and pattern-based concepts for competition against an expert, but lacked the same knowledge for competition against less expert players. With lesson and practice training, pattern learning continued on every contest, but AWL was applied only to the lessons, so that Hoyle learned to imitate only the expert. The reflection Advisors for lose tic-tac-toe and the mill Advisors for five men's morris have weights that remain among the top few in the third tier during learning with AWL.
Although the reflection Advisors tend to emerge only after 80 or so contests, they typically achieve weights higher than 10 of the 17 second-tier Advisors. Figure 9 : Some learned concepts for five men's morris. α and β denote either X or O (or black or white) consistently; NIL denotes an empty position. Note that the mover for a concept is in the current state, but the pattern is matched for in a subsequent state.
Discussion
Our work not only integrates pattern learning with high-level reasoning, it also suggests how the former gradually comes to support and enhance the latter. We do not advocate reliance on pattern-learning alone. That would ignore the other higher-level processes quite evident in humans. Indeed, Hoyle learns many other kinds of useful knowledge detailed elsewhere (Epstein, 1992) . Pattern learning is, however, an important component in skill development, one that those interested in the simulation of human intelligence or the design of adaptive game-playing programs cannot afford to ignore.
Each of the patterns Hoyle now learns is a generalization over a class of states that occurs with some frequency and contains a simple configuration of spatially-related markers. These patterns occur in the context of a particular stage of the game and are consistently associated with a single outcome. An associative pattern classifier provides learning whose possibly premature guidance is tempered by the higher-level reasoning of the other Advisors. More experienced, conceptbased Advisors gradually emerge to emphasize broader generalities, and are expected to advocate expert play to retain their status. Finally, the identification and exclusion of uninformative patterns constrains the pattern generator and thereby focuses the entire process more intelligently.
In any attempt to replicate this learning model, one must allow enough time for patterns to migrate from the waiting list into the cache and to validate the game-dependent Advisors. There is an intricate relationship among the number of contests played, the threshold that keeps patterns on the waiting list, and the aging parameters for the waiting list and the cache. For example, Hoyle learns tic-tac-toe so quickly with a visual threshold of 2 that it has no opportunity to create concepts at all. Although we tested other combinations, the parameter values used here were the most successful.
The choice of these five particular BPL shapes is not central to the theme of this research, but was used as a starting point to illustrate the operation of the system. When students in our laboratory learn these games, they repeatedly cite small geometric arrangements of pieces as salient patterns, much like Simon's chunks (Chase and Simon, 1973) . More complex games will require a more complex BPL, for example, one that would include thickness and shape for Go.
An important problem, however, is to define and test for chunks in a way that minimizes the potential combinatoric explosion. In a game with n possible board locations and only t types of markers (including blanks), there are t n possible patterns.
Not all visual patterns, of course, are worth detecting or remembering. If patterns are overly specific (e.g., an exact board description) there will be too many of them. If patterns are overly general (e.g., a marker in a corner) they may provide little reliable information in the context of the game tree. Even when a visual pattern is at the "right" level of specificity, it may not be worth noticing (e.g., the patterns in Fig. 8e and 8f ) because nothing important is denoted by its presence. Statistical pattern recognition also requires adequate experience to render it reliable; in an extremely large space that may be impossible. We have employed a variety of devices to limit the number of identified patterns: BPL for game-independent template generation with a visual bias, normalization for symmetry, and the field of view parameter. Each of them is empirically observable in humans and captures certain kinds of regularity detected in their visual system, such as the generalization on symmetry and biases toward learning regular and more compact patterns (Darley, et al., 1981) .
Related Work

Expert Game Players, Human and Machine
Psychologists have established, contrary to popular belief, that game-playing experts do not have distinctive mental abilities (like exceptional powers of concentration, enormous memories, or high IQ's), that they do not do extensive forward search into the game tree, and that they do not rely on statistical measures of typicality or concrete visual images during play (Binet, 1894; Charness, 1981; Djakow, et al., 1927; Holding, 1985) . What grandmasters do have are perceptual focus of attention, carefully organized knowledge, and procedures to manipulate that knowledge.
They summarize some of their knowledge in concepts, both as verbal memories and as chunks. A grandmaster's recall is better than an ordinary person's on chess positions, but only for chess positions that are meaningful, i.e., ones that would arise during the play of a contest (Chase and Simon, 1973) .
In general, empirical evidence indicates that skilled people in many domains have better memories, but only for meaningful patterns, and that, given the same knowledge, an unskilled person remains unskilled, i.e., cannot apply it appropriately. (See, for example, (Allard, et al., 1980; Egan and Schwartz, 1979; Engle and Bukstel, 1978; Shneiderman, 1976) .) An expert's memory is organized contextually, so that a single board configuration that could arise in either of two different games is chunked and recalled differently, depending upon the game in which it is perceived (Eisenstadt and Kareev, 1975) . There is also some evidence that a limited amount of memory organization may be around prototypes, i.e., that certain situations may be reminiscent of others (Goldin, 1978; Watkins, et al., 1984) .
The typical game-playing program, in contrast, plays only one game and does not learn, plan, or retain its experience. Instead it uses fast, deep, sophisticated search, and a feature-based evaluation function that estimates the strength of any possible game state as a real number (Rich and Knight, 1991) . It also relies on an opening book of early move sequences favored by human experts. Often this is implemented with special-purpose hardware. The programmer selects static features that human experts hold in high regard. The tradeoff between the number of nodes searched and the time devoted to computation at each node is critical for real-time performance, and is well documented in the game-playing literature (Kierulf, 1989; Lee and Mahajan, 1990 ).
Large-scale memory for endgames has resulted in strong play for checkers and nine-men's morris; statistics on the success of each previously encountered state have fared less well (DeJong and Schultz, 1988; Schaeffer, et al., 1991; Schultz and De Jong, 1988) .
Cognitive scientists, however, consider this brute force approach not at all reflective of the processes they observe in skilled experts. Practical problem-solving and decision-making domains offer challenges in scale well beyond most games. Brute-force memory approaches in game playing include full-blown retrograde analysis and statistics on how often an encountered state is associated with a win. The former overlooks context, and the latter can only be helpful when the same states are repeatedly encountered, that is in games where there are few enough "typical" states. And both of these mass-memory approaches overlook the AI objective; the intent of a game-playing program is to make decisions like an expert, not to know or remember exhaustively. Our work moves instead toward Clancey's "dialectic coupling of sensorimotor systems in an ongoing sequence of coordinations" (Clancey, 1993) .
Pattern-oriented Play
In AI, visual cues have previously demonstrated their power as explicit search control directives and as hand-selected terms in an evaluation function (Gelernter, 1963; Samuel, 1963) . There is also evidence that perceptually-based schemas for geometry theorem proving support planning at a more abstract level and thereby limit search (Koedinger and Anderson, 1990) . Visual imagery, as an alternative representation has been addressed in part by Glasgow's computational imagery, but without a procedural component (Glasgow and Papadias, 1992) . "Pure" pattern-oriented programs learn slowly and tend to be unreliable (Boyan, 1992; Michie, 1974; Painter, 1993) .
Nonetheless, many important game-playing programs have had strong, visually-oriented features in their evaluation functions (Kierulf, 1989; Lee and Mahajan, 1990; Samuel, 1963; Samuel, 1967) .
There is more than one kind of pattern that expert programs detect. Programs that learn predicate calculus plans or EBL explanations are slowed by extensive matching time (Fawcett and Utgoff, 1991; Freed, 1991; Morales, 1991; Wilkins, 1980; Yee, et al., 1990) . The use of chunks to focus attention and abstract the chess board has met with some limited success (Campbell, 1988; Flann, 1992; George and Schaeffer, 1991 ). Morph's tactical patterns are based on threat and defense (Levinson and Snyder, 1991) . Our work takes a different approach but overlaps somewhat with Morph. Inspection of the 12 published patterns learned by a Morph-like variant playing tic-tac-toe (Levinson, et al., 1992) shows several that are covered by Hoyle Advisors (e.g., Victory, Panic, Open, and Pitchfork). A mill in the morris games is not a Morphlike pattern, however, nor is symmetry through the center (although the components are). There is nothing in the architecture of this system that precludes Morph-like patterns from this framework.
There has been much work on generalization methods for data represented in predicate calculus, in rule-based formulations, and numerically, as well as some work on matrix-oriented visual perception (Anderson, 1986; DeJong, 1986; Dietterich and Michalski, 1983; Glasgow and Papadias, 1992; Kodratoff and Ganascia, 1986; Langley, et al., 1986; Sammut and Banerji, 1986) . Future work will develop additional generalization rules based on these methods.
Limitations and Future Work
For the initial test of this overall approach we used simple games and made a number of simplifications in the individual components of the system. Patsy, the Advisor based on individual patterns, was placed in Hoyle's second tier. The correct tier assignment for the new Advisors created from pattern-based concepts is another subject of current research. They were placed in the third tier for the experiments described here, to avoid interference with a preexisting second tier that already worked quite well. To improve computational efficiency, however, and to model the transition to automaticity, the pattern-based Advisors should either reside in the second tier or gradually migrate to it. Then, if they competed in parallel with the other second-tier Advisors, the pattern-based Advisors should comment much faster in situations where they are applicable, and thereby supplant the others.
Thus far, the AWL algorithm that learns problem-class-specific weights for decision-making procedures is interactive; a human is asked "permission" before an Advisor is removed because it is irrelevant, self-contradictory, or harmful. We intend to automate this process fully, so that Hoyle will once again be a system without human intervention. We are also testing a variety of loss bounds for use with AWL (Haussler, et al., 1994; Kivinen and Warmuth, 1994) .
For the purposes of this study, we limited pattern learning to four states in each contest, two from each stage resulting from each contestant's last non-forced move. These game states near the end of the game, or the end of a game stage in the case of the morris games, proved to capture significant patterns in these shallow games. Our current research includes more sophisticated methods of learning pattern associations. It might be possible to use states preceding subgoals to provide patterns in the middle game. We are also experimenting with temporal difference learning to consider every pattern as it arises in states throughout a contest (Sutton, 1988) .
Future work includes more difficult games and other kinds of templates for spatial relations (such as center, edge, perimeter, bounded regions, length, and area), and causally-based pattern generation where one or more patterns that give rise to concepts are combined to create new, larger, somewhat less regular patterns. We intend to experiment with other learning algorithms to determine which is best for our application, and to develop and test a suite of generalization rules and meta-rules to construct concepts from patterns, so that, for example, the two reflection concepts for lose tic-tac-toe become a single one, as do the two mill concepts for five men's morris.
